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Abstract
We present the first dynamic universal accumulator that allows (1) the accumulation of elements in a DDH-hard group G and (2) one who knows x such that
y = g x has — or has not — been accumulated, where g generates G, to efficiently
prove her knowledge of such x in zero knowledge, and hence without revealing,
e.g., x or y.
We introduce the Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential System (ABACS),
which allows the verifier to authenticate anonymous users according to any access
control policy expressible as a formula of possibly negated boolean user attributes.
We construct the system from our accumulator.
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Introduction

1.1
1.1.1

Background
Accumulators

Introduced by Benaloh and de Mare [BdM93], accumulators allow the representation
of a set of elements Y = {y1 , y2 , . . . , yn } by a single value v of size independent of Y ’s
cardinality; using an initial value u, one can accumulate Y into v by invoking the accumulating function f as v := f(u, Y ). Accumulators should be collision-resistant [BP97]:
for any element y and any value v, there exists an efficiently computable witness w for
y w.r.t. v if and only if y has been accumulated into v (often abbreviated as “y is in
v”). To prove that y is in v, one can thus demonstrate the existence of a corresponding
w by proving, potentially in zero-knowledge, the knowledge of w.
Several uses of accumulators, e.g., in anonymous credential systems [CL01], require
them to be dynamic [CL02b]: one can efficiently update an accumulator value by adding
elements to — and possibly later deleting them from — the value. Furthermore, when
a value is updated, e.g., from v to v 0 , the witness w for some element y w.r.t. v can also
be efficiently updated to the witness w0 for the same element y w.r.t. the new value v 0 .
Such accumulators are called dynamic accumulators (DA’s).
Dynamic universal accumulators (DUA’s) [LLX07], on the other hand, are DA’s
with the additional property of universality: for any element set Y and any element
ȳ, there exists an efficiently computable non-membership witness w̄ for ȳ w.r.t. value
v = f(u, Y ) if and only if ȳ 6∈ Y . By demonstrating the existence of w̄, one can prove
that ȳ is not in v. Non-membership witnesses should allow efficient update.
Several existing DA/DUA constructions have f : (u, {y1 , y2 , . . . , yn }) 7→
y
y
1
u 2 ...yn mod N as their accumulating function [BP97, CL02b, LLX07], where N is
a safe-prime product and u ∈ QR(N )1 . They permit only primes (up to a certain size)
to be accumulated. Their security relies on the Strong RSA (SRSA) assumption [BP97].
Nguyen [Ngu05] constructed a DA from bilinear pairings (to be defined later). It
has f : (u, {y1 , y2 , . . . , yn }) 7→ u(s+y1 )(s+y2 )...(s+yn ) as the accumulating function, where
s is the master secret of the accumulator instance and u is in some group equipped
with a bilinear pairing. The construction allows elements in Zp \{−s} for some prime
p to be accumulated. Its security relies on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption [BB04]. Unlike the above “SRSA-based” constructions, dynamically adding
an element to a value in Nguyen’s construction requires the knowledge of the master
secret s.
An accumulator would not be too useful (at least for building anonymous credential systems) without a suite of efficient zero-knowledge protocols for proving various
facts about the accumulator values and elements. For instance, all the aforementioned
constructions come with a protocol that proves in zero-knowledge that a commitment
c opens to some element in an accumulator value v.
1

QR(N ) denotes the group of quadratic residues modulo N .
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1.1.2

Anonymous credential systems

In an anonymous credential system (ACS) [CL01], those and only those users who have
registered to an organization O can authenticate their membership in O to any verifier
(e.g., a server, another organization, etc.) anonymously and unlinkably among the set
of all members in O. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01] constructed the first ACS
using a signature scheme with efficient protocols [CL02a] (commonly referred to as CLsignatures or P-signatures [BCKL08]) as a key building block. Many subsequent works
have taken the same approach [CL02a, CL02b, CL04, BCKL08].
In this approach, to join an organization O, a user U first registers her pseudonym,
which is simply a commitment of her pre-established private key xU , e.g., in her PKI
credential. Pseudonyms (even those of the same user) are hence unlinkable. O then
issues a CL-signature σU on xU according to the issuing protocol for CL-signatures,
during which O learns nothing about xU . U uses σU as her anonymous credential.
To be able to revoke membership efficiently, O can maintain a DA as a “white-list”
of users whose membership has not yet been revoked [CL02b], by adding each user U ’s
credential σU (or its identifier) to its DA when U registers and, when desired, deleting
σU from DA to revoke U ’s membership. Therefore, to demonstrate her non-revoked
membership in O to a verifier V , U conducts a zero-knowledge proof that (1) she has
O’s signature on her private key, and that (2) the signature is a credential in O’s current
DA. Alternatively, O can maintain a DUA as a “blacklist” of users whose membership
has been revoked [LLX07]. In this case, to demonstrate her non-revoked membership
in O, U instead proves in zero-knowledge that (1) she has O’s signature on her private
key, and that (2) the signature is not a credential in O’s current DUA.

1.2

Attribute-based anonymous credential systems

As a major contribution of this paper, we present the Attribute-Based Anonymous
Credential System (ABACS), which generalizes the conventional notion of anonymous
credential system (ACS) [CL01], in a fashion analogous to how Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [BSW07] generalizes public-key encryption,
and how attribute certificates generalize identity certificates in X.509 PKIs [FH02].
Credentials in ABACS can be more precisely referred to as anonymous attribute
credentials — they are issued to users to certify their possession of an attribute, allowing
the users to prove various facts to any verifier about their credential ownership and
hence attribute possession in some anonymous fashion. ABACS thus enables privacypreserving attribute-based access control , in which a server is willing to grant a user
access to an object such as a file or a service so long as the attributes possessed and/or
lacked by the user satisfy the server’s access control policy on the object, while privacyconcerned users desire to access the object by revealing merely the fact that they satisfy
the policy, and thus concealing, e.g., their identity, how they satisfy the policy, and etc.
In this paper, we confine ourselves to boolean attributes only. (Some attributes
such as age and weight may take a value from a wider range such as non-negative
integers and real numbers, and are hence non-boolean.) Boolean attributes provide
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rich semantics for labeling objects for access control. For example, they can represent
group membership, or “roles” in Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
1.2.1

Features

ABACS is a credential system with the following features.
• Flexible attribute-based access control The verifier can choose to enforce any access
control policy expressible as a boolean attribute formula in disjunctive normal
form (DNF), i.e., a disjunction of terms, where each term is a conjunction of
possibly negated boolean attributes, e.g., “(Student ∧ Bio) ∨ (¬Bio)”.
• Multiple ACAs To support an attribute, a corresponding Attribute Certification
Authority (ACA) is created (during setup or dynamically when needed) to issue
credentials to users to certify their possession of that attribute. These ACAs are
mutually independent; an ACA can only certify the possession of attributes for
which it was created. This allows them to have different certification procedures
with different trust levels, and confines the damages of their compromises.
• Robust accountability The verifier accepts in the authentication only if the authenticating user satisfies the access control policy being enforced, i.e., the corresponding boolean formula evaluates to true on input the set of attribute for
which the user has acquired a credential2 .
Hence, a user who has acquired a credential for an attribute can’t pretend that she
hasn’t, and colluding users, none of which alone satisfy the policy, can’t satisfy
it by pooling together their credentials.
• Anonymous authentication The verifier knows only whether an authenticating user
satisfies the access control policy he is enforcing. More precisely, authentication
attempts by honest users who (resp. do not) satisfy the verifier’s policy are
anonymous and unlinkable among the set of all users who also (resp. do not)
satisfy the policy.
• Anonymous certification While ACAs must make public some data related to
the certification status of users’ attribute possession for authentication to be
possible, some applications may require that such data reveals no (computational)
information about the identity of the certified users, or more generally, no one
can tell if two ACAs have issued a credential to a common user.
• Efficiency and practical negation support The authentication can be done in O(|P |)
time, where |P | is the size of the verifier’s policy measured in the number of
(negated) attributes in it, and hence regardless of, e.g., the number of users,
verifiers, ACAs, or attributes that the authenticating user possesses/lacks.
2
A (resp. negated) attribute in a formula evaluates to true if and only if it is (resp. not) contained
in the user’s attribute set.
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Also, a user who lacks an attribute never has to contact anyone (e.g., the corresponding ACA) before she can prove her lack of the attribute.
1.2.2

Applications

The two scenarios below can benefit from ABACS.
The Biology department provides free parking to its students and any visitor from
outside the department. The parking lot entrance hence enforces an access control
policy of “(Bio ∧ Student) ∨ (¬Bio)”. Identifiable authentication solutions3 would
violate the privacy desired by some users. A solution should allow different departments
to locally manage their own “membership”. Also, a visitor shouldn’t have to show up
at the Biology Department to get a “¬Bio” credential before he or she can park.
A pharmacist must check that “Fever ∧ ¬Asthma” holds for a patient before dispensing Aspirin (as many asthma sufferers are allergic to Aspirin), while the patient
may not want to disclose her entire medical record, e.g., when she has an unrelated
genetic disorder. Also, a fever patient with asthma with the “help” from someone
without fever or asthma must still be unable to obtain Aspirin.

1.3

Preliminaries

Bilinear pairings A bilinear pairing is a mapping from a pair of group elements to
a group element. Specifically, let G1 and G2 be some cyclic groups of prime order p.
Let g be a generator of G1 . A function ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear pairing if the
following holds:
• Unique Representation. Each element in G1 , G2 has unique binary representation.
• Bilinearity. e(Ax , g y ) = e(A, B)xy for all A, B ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zp .
• Non-degeneracy. e(g, g) 6= 1, where 1 is the identity element in G2 .
• Efficient Computability. e(A, B) can be computed efficiently (i.e. in polynomial
time) for all A, B ∈ G1 .
Complexity assumptions The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G is
defined as follows: On input a quadruple (h0 , h1 , hx0 , y ∗ ) ∈ G4 , output 1 if y ∗ = hx1 and
0 otherwise. We say that the DDH assumption holds in G if no PPT algorithm has
non-negligible advantage over random guessing in solving the DDH problem in G. We
call a group DDH-hard if the DDH assumption holds in the group.
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem in G = hg0 i is defined as follows: On
2
q
input a (q +1)-tuple (g0 , g0α , g0α , . . ., g0α ) ∈ Gq+1 , output a pair (w, y) ∈ G×Z∗p , where
p is the order of G, such that w(α+y) = g0 . We say that the q-SDH assumption holds
in G if no PPT algorithm has non-negligible advantage in solving the q-SDH problem
in G.
3

e.g., waving an RFID card, or an e-token installed with X.509 attribute certificates
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Zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge In a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol [GMR89], a prover convinces a verifier that some statement is true without the
verifier learning anything except the validity of the statement. We use Camenisch and
Stadler’s notation [CS97]. For example, P K{(x) : y = g x } denotes a zero-knowledge
proof-of-knowledge protocol that proves the knowledge of the discrete logarithm of y
to the base g.

2

Solution Overview

We briefly describe how we construct a DUA that allows the accumulation of elements
in a DDH-hard group, which we call DUA-DDH. We then highlight how we build ABACS
from it.

2.1

Dynamic universal accumulators for DDH groups

To construct DUA-DDH, we take Nguyen’s DA construction as the point of departure;
we augment universality to it. Li et al. [LLX07] presented a technique to augment universality to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya’s DA construction [CL02b]. The technique,
however, requires the unique factorization of integers and relies on the SRSA assumption, and hence is not immediately applicable to Nguyen’s DA. Fortunately, we make
the observation that the technique works as long as the domain of accumulatable elements is (a subset of) a Euclidean domain. (In the case of Li et al.’s, the domain is
the ring of integers.) Consequently, to augment universality to Nguyen’s construction,
we adapt the technique to work on a different Euclidean domain, namely the ring of
polynomials over a finite field.
We also equip our accumulator construction with a few useful zero-knowledge protocols. Of particular importance is the following pair:

 P K {(x, y) : C = Com1 (x) ∧ D = Com2 (y) ∧ y = g x ∧ y is in v)}


P K {(x, y) : C = Com1 (x) ∧ D = Com2 (y) ∧ y = g x ∧ y is not in v)}

where Com1 and Com2 are commitment schemes and g generates a DDH group, the
elements in which can be accumulated in our accumulator. We construct the protocol
using Pedersen’s commitment scheme [Ped91] and Camenisch’s technique for proving
double discrete logarithms [CS97]. The construction has a complexity of O(λ) for a
cheating probability of 2−λ .
These protocols are the cornerstone of our ABACS construction.

2.2

Attribute-based anonymous credential systems

Let G be a DDH group. Let ACA i be the ACA that certifies users’ possession of
attribute i. Each ACA i instantiates and maintains a DUA-DDH Ai of its own, but for
the same G, and independently picks a generator gi of G at random.
7

Let U be a user with a pre-established private key x. For each attribute i she
possesses, she can get certified by ACA i by providing her pseudonym yi = gix w.r.t.
ACA i. ACA i then adds yi to its Ai . To later revoke the certification, ACA i can
simply delete yi from Ai . Finally, for each attribute j U lacks, she need not do anything
(such as contacting ACA j); her pseudonym w.r.t. ACA j is by default not in ACA j’s
Aj .
Each ACA i publishes Ai , gi (with a proof of their correct generation) and the list
of pseudonyms that have been added in Ai . Thanks to the DDH assumption, no one
— not even to the ACAs — can tell which user a pseudonym belongs to, or whether
two ACAs’ pseudonym lists contain a common user (non-negligibly better than random
guessing).
From the published information, a user can compute a (resp. non-) membership
witness for each attribute i she has (resp. not) been certified. The first-time computation takes O(|Li |) time when ACA i has certified |Li | users. This computation can be
further reduced to O(1) by moving the computation to ACA which is in possession of
the auxiliary information of the accumulator. Updating the witness in the future take
constant time per each change in the list of certified users.
User U who possesses attribute i and has been certified by ACA i can prove such
fact to any verifier during authentication by proving that she has the knowledge of
some x such that yi = gix is in Ai . Similarly, if U lacks attribute j, she can prove the
fact by proving that yj = gjx is not in Aj . These proofs can be accomplished in constant
time. Generalizing the proof using a standard technique [CDS94], a user can prove the
validity of any DNF boolean attribute formula in time linear in the size of the formula.

3

Our Dynamic Universal Accumulators for DDH Groups

3.1

Definitions

We incrementally define Dynamic Universal Accumulators for DDH Groups (DUADDH’s). We start by adapting Li et al.’s definition of universality to pairing-based
accumulators.
Definition 1 (Universal Accumulators (UAs)) A universal accumulator is a
scheme with the following properties:
• Efficient generation There exists a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm Gen that, on input security parameter 1λ , outputs a tuple (f, g, Yf , u, tf ),
where f is a function Uf × Yf0 → Uf and g is another function Uf → Ug for some
domains Yf 0 , Uf , Ug ; Yf ⊆ Yf0 is the domain for accumulatable elements; tf is some
optional auxiliary information about f; and u is a element in Uf . We assume the
tuple (f, g) is drawn uniformly at random from its domain.
• Quasi-commutativity For all (f, g, Yf , ·) ← Gen(1λ ), v ∈ Uf and y1 , y2 ∈ Yf0 , we
have f( f(v, y1 ), y2 ) = f( f(v, y2 ), y1 ). Hence, if Y = {y1 , . . ., yk } ⊂ Yf0 , then we
can denote f( · · · f( f(v, y1 ), y2 ) · · · , yk ) by f(v, Y ) unambiguously.
8

• Efficient evaluation For all (f, g, Yf , tf , u) ← Gen(1λ ), v ∈ Uf , and Y ⊂ Yf
so that |Y | is polynomial in λ, the function g ◦ f(v, Y ) is computable in time
polynomial in λ. v = g ◦ f(u, Y ) represents the set Y . We call v the accumulator
value for Y and say that y has been accumulated into v (or y is “in” v), for all
y ∈Y.
• Membership (resp. non-membership) witnesses For all (f, g, Yf , ·) ←
Gen(1λ ), there exists a relation Ω (resp. Ω) that defines membership (resp.
non-membership) witnesses: w (resp. w) is a valid membership (resp. nonmembership) witness for element y ∈ Yf w.r.t. accumulator value v ∈ Uf if and
only if Ω(w, y, v) = 1 (resp. Ω(w, y, v) = 1). Membership witness (resp. nonmembership witness) should be efficiently computable (in polynomial-time in λ)
with tf .
t
u
The security of universal accumulators requires that it is hard to find a valid membership (resp. non-membership) witness for an element that is not in (resp. is indeed
in) an accumulator value w.r.t. that accumulator value. We employ a strong definition in which the adversary is considered successful even if he present an element that
is outside the intended domain of the accumulator (Yf0 instead of Yf ). Accumulators
with this stronger sense of security improves efficiency of systems on which it is based
because users within this system needs not conduct proof to demonstrate the elements
presented is inside the intended domain of the accumulator. Below we give a precise
definition.
Definition 2 (Security of Universal Accumulators (UAs)) A universal accumulator is secure if, for any PPT algorithm A, both P1 and P2 are negligible in λ,
where:



(f, g, Yf , u, ·) ← Gen(1λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← A(g ◦ f, g, Yf , u) :


,
P1 = Pr


Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Yf0 \Y ∧ Ω(w, y, g ◦ f(u, Y )) = 1





(f, g, Yf , u) ← Gen(1λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← A(g ◦ f, g, Yf , u) :


 P2 = Pr
.
Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Y ∧ Ω(w, y, g ◦ f(u, Y )) = 1
t
u
Definition 3 (Dynamic Universal Accumulators (DUAs)) A DUA is an UA
with the following additional properties:
• Efficient update of accumulator There exists an efficient algorithm D1 such
that for all v = g◦f(u, Y ), y ∈
/ Y and v̂ ← D1 (tf , v, y), we have v̂ = g◦f(u, Y ∪{y}).
If y ∈ Y instead, then we have v̂ = g ◦ f(1, Y \ {y}) instead.
• Efficient update of membership witnesses Let v and v̂ be the original and
updated accumulator values respectively and ŷ be the newly added (or deleted)
element. There exists an efficient algorithm D2 that, on input y, w, v, v̂ with y 6= ŷ
and Ω(w, y, v) = 1, outputs ŵ such that Ω(ŵ, y, v̂) = 1.
9

• Efficient update of non-membership witnesses Let v and v̂ be the original and updated accumulator values respectively and ŷ be the newly added (or
deleted) element. There exists an efficient algorithm D3 that, on input y, w, v, v̂
t
u
with y 6= ŷ and Ω(w, y, v) = 1, outputs ŵ such that Ω(ŵ, y, v̂) = 1.
In the above, we call an algorithm “efficient” if its time complexity is independent
of the cardinality of the accumulated element set Y . Security of DUA is defined as
follows. Capabilities of an adversary is defined through queries to oracle OD which
models a working DUA. OD is initialized with the tuple (f, g, Yf , u, tf ) and maintains
a list of elements Y , which is initially empty. OD responds to two types of queries,
namely “add y” and “delete y.” It responds to an “add y” query by adding y to the
set Y , modifying the accumulator value v using algorithm D1 and sending back the
updated accumulator value v̂. It responds to a “delete y” query by deleting it from set
Y , modifying the accumulator value v using algorithm D1 and sending back the updated
accumulator value v̂. In the end, OD outputs the current set Y and accumulator value
v. The following is the definition of secure DUA.
Definition 4 (Security of Dynamic Universal Accumulators (DUAs)) An
universal accumulator is secure if, for any PPT algorithm A, P3 and P4 are negligible
in λ, where:



λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← AOD (f,g,Yf ,tf ) (g ◦ f, g, Y ) :
(f,
g,
Y
,
u,
t
)
←
Gen(1

f
f
f
 P3 = Pr


Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Yf0 \Y ∧ v = g ◦ f(u, Y ) ∧ Ω(w, y, v) = 1






(f, g, Yf , u, tf ) ← Gen(1λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← AOD (f,g,Yf ,tf ) (g ◦ f, g, Yf ) :

 P4 = Pr
Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Y ∧ v = g ◦ f(u, Y ) ∧ Ω(w, y, v) = 1
t
u
We state the following theorem. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 A DUA is secure if the underlying UA is secure.

t
u

Finally, a DUA-DDH is a DUA such that there exists a cyclic group G ⊂ Yf in which
the DDH assumption holds.

3.2

Constructions

We construct our DUA-DDH in stages. We first give a construction of UA for DDH
groups. We then adds the necessary algorithms for enabling dynamism.
3.2.1

Our UA construction

This construction can be thought as the extension of Nguyen’s accumulator to support
universality. Our computation of non-membership witnesses involves operations on
polynomials over finite fields.
10

• Generation Let λ be a security parameter. Let ê : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear
pairing such that |G1 | = |G2 | = p for some λ-bit prime p. Let g0 be a generator
of G1 and Gq = hhi be a cyclic group of prime order q such that Gq ⊂ Z∗p .4 The
generation algorithm Gen randomly chooses α ∈R Z∗p . For simplicity, we always
take the initial element u = 1, the identity element in Zp∗ . The function f is
defined as f : Z∗p × Z∗p → Z∗p such that f : u, y 7→ u(y + α). The function g is
defined as g : Z∗p × G1 such that g : y 7→ g0y . The domain Yf of accumulatable
elements is Gq 5 . The auxiliary information tf is α.
• Evaluation Computing g◦f(1, Y ) efficiently is straightforward with the auxiliary
information α. In case one wishes to allow computation of g ◦ f without α, one
i
number
can publish g0α for i = 0 to k, where k is the maximum
Q
P of elements
i
to be accumulated. If we denote the polynomial y∈Y (y + α) = i=k
i=0 (ui α ) of
maximum degree k as v(α), one can efficiently compute g ◦ f(1, Y ) as g ◦ f(1, Y ) =
Q
v(α)
ui
g0 = i=k
i=0 gi ∈ G1 , without the knowledge of α.
• Membership witnesses The relation Ω is defined as Ω(w, y, v) = 1 if and
only if ê(w, g0y g0α ) = ê(v, g0 ). For a set of elements Y := {y1 , . . . , yk } ∈ Gq , a
membership witness for the element y ∈ Y can be computed in either one of the
following ways, depending on whether one knows the auxiliary information.
Qk

– (With auxiliary information.) Compute the witness as w = [g0

1
i=1 (yi +α) α+y

]

.

Qk

– (Without auxiliary information.) Let w(α) be the polynomial i=1,i6=j (yi +
P
i
α). Expand w and write it as w(α) = i=k−1
i=0 (ui α ). Compute the witness
Q
w(α)
i=k−1 ui
as w = g0
= i=0
gi ∈ G1 .
• Non-membership witnesses The relation Ω for non-membership witnesses is
defined as Ω(w, y, v) = 1 if and only if w = (c, d) and ê(c, g0y g0α )ê(g0 , g0 )d =
ê(v, g0 ). For a set of elements Y := {y1 , . . . , yk } ∈ Gq , a non-membership witness
for ỹ ∈
/ Y can be computed in either one of the following ways, depending on
whether one knows the auxiliary information:
– (With auxiliary information.) Compute w = (c, d) according to d =
Qk
i=1 (yi +α)−d
Qk
ỹ+α
(y
+
α)
mod
(α
+
ỹ)
∈
Z
and
c
=
g
∈ G1 .
i
p
0
i=1
Q
– (Without auxiliary information.) Denote the polynomial v(α) as ki=1 (yi +
α). Compute a polynomial division of v(α) by (α + ỹ). Since (α + ỹ) is
a degree one polynomial and ỹ 6= yi for all i, there exists a degree k − 1
polynomial c(α) and a constant d such that v(α) = c(α)(α + ỹ) + d. Expand
Pi=k−1
Qi=k−1 ui
c(α)
c and write it as c(α) = i=0
(ui αi ). Compute c = g0 = i=0
gi ∈
G1 . The non-membership witness of ỹ is w = (c, d).
4
5

If p = 2q + 1, one can choose a random element in h ∈R Z∗p with order q and set Gq = hhi.
Formally, it is Gq \ {−α}.
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The theorem below states the security of our UA. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 2 (Security of our UA construction) Under the k-SDH assumption in
G1 , the above construction is a secure universal accumulator.
u
t
3.2.2

Our DUA-DDH construction

We present our construction of DUA-DDH by adding the various dynamism algorithms
D1 , D2 , D3 to our UA construction above. Due to Theorem 1 and 2, our construction
is secure under the k-SDH assumption.
• Update of accumulator (algorithm D1 ) Adding an element ŷ to the accumulator value v can be done by computing v̂ = v ŷ+α . Similarly, deleting an element
1
ŷ in the accumulator v can be done by computing v̂ = v ŷ+α . Both cases require
the auxiliary information α.
• Update of membership witnesses (algorithm D2 ) Let w be the original
membership witness of y w.r.t the accumulator value v. Let v̂ and ŷ be the new
accumulator value and the element added (resp. deleted) respectively. Suppose ŷ
has been added, the new membership witness ŵ for y can be computed as vwŷ−y .
Suppose ŷ 6= y has been deleted, the new non-membership witness ŵ for y can
1
1
be computed as w ŷ−y v̂ y−ŷ .
• Update of non-membership witnesses (algorithm D3 ) Let c, d be the original non-membership witness of y w.r.t. accumulator value v. Let v̂ and ŷ be the
new accumulator value and the element added (resp. deleted) respectively.
– (Addition.) Suppose ŷ 6= y has been added, the new non-membership witness ĉ, dˆ of y can be computed as ĉ = vcŷ−y ∈ G1 and dˆ = d(ŷ − y) ∈ Z∗p .
This can be verified as follows:
v̂ =v α+ŷ = v (α+y)+(ŷ−y) = v α+y v ŷ−y = v α+y (cα+y g0d )ŷ−y
d(ŷ−y)

=[vcŷ−y ]α+y g0

ˆ

= ĉα+y g0d

– (Deletion.) Suppose ŷ has been deleted, the new non-membership witness
1
d
ĉ, dˆ of y can be computed as ĉ = (cv̂ −1 ) ŷ−y ∈ G1 and dˆ = ŷ−y
∈ Z∗p . Indeed,
v̂ =v̂

(α+ŷ)−(α+y)
ŷ−y

1

α+y

1

α+y

= v ŷ−y v̂ y−ŷ = [cα+y g0d ] ŷ−y v̂ y−ŷ
1

1

d

ˆ

=[(cv̂ −1 )α+y g0d ] ŷ−y = [(cv̂ −1 ) ŷ−y ]α+y g0ŷ−y = ĉα+y g0d
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4

Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Our DUA-DDH

We present several efficient zero-knowledge protocols for our DUA-DDH construction.
In the presentation, we give priority to clarity over efficiency; the protocols may be
optimized for better performance.
Let G1 = hgi and Gq = hhi be cyclic groups of prime order p and q respectively, such
that Gq ⊂ Z∗p is the domain of our DUA-DDH construction. Let g0 , g1 and h0 , h1 , h2 be
independent generators of G1 and Gq respectively. Let y = hx0 ∈ Gq and let C = gy0 gr1 ∈
G1 be the commitment of y using random number r. Let v be an accumulator value.

4.1

Proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of a committed element

This protocol is the main building block of the protocols used in our DUA-DDH construction. We call it PK1 . Let D = hx1 hs2 ∈ Gq be the commitment of x using some
random number s. The goal of PK1 is to prove the knowledge of x and y such that
y = hx0 in zero-knowledge, thus without revealing, e.g., x or y. In other words, we have:



y r
x s
x
PK1 y, r, x, s : C = g0 g1 ∧ D = h1 h2 ∧ y = h0
The protocol can be used with the common discrete logarithm relationship
proofs [Cam98] to demonstrate relationships of discrete logarithms in G1 or Gq . Instantiation of PK1 makes use of the zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of double discrete
logarithms [CS97], as we now describe. Let λk be a security parameter that determines
the cheating probability of the protocol. (The cheating probability is 2−λk , we hence
suggest λk = 80.) PK1 consists of PK1A and PK1B as follows.





y r

PK
y,
r
:
C
=
g
g

1A
0 1


PK1





hx

x hs
0 r

x,
r,
s
:
C
=
g
g
∧
D
=
h
PK

1B
1 2
0 1
Instantiating PK1A is straightforward. Below we only show how to instantiate
PK1B .
(Commitment.) For i = 1 to λk , the prover randomly generates ρx,i , ρs,i ∈R Zq and
h

ρx,i

ρ

ρ

ρ

ρr,i ∈R Zp , computes T1,i = g00 g1r,i ∈ G1 and T2,i = h1x,i h2s,i ∈ Gq , and sends
T1,i , T2,i to the verifier.
(Challenge.) The verifier randomly generates a λk -bit challenge m and sends it to the
prover.
(Response.) Denote by m[i] the i-th bit of m, starting from i = 1. For i = 1 to
λk , the prover computes zx,i = ρx,i − m[i]x ∈ Zq , zs,i = ρs,i − m[i]s ∈ Zq and
λk
zri = ρr,i − m[i]hx0 r ∈ Zp . She sends zx,i , zs,i , zr,i i=1
to the verifier.
13

(Verify.) The verifier outputs 1 if the following holds for all i = 1 to λk . He outputs
0 otherwise.
(
?

T2,i =

z
z
Dm[i] h1x,i h2s,i

?

and T1,i =

h

zx,i

z

g00 g1r,i ,
z
h0x,i

C

z
g1r,i ,

if m[i] = 0,
otherwise.

It is straightforward to show that PK1 is Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. It can
be converted into a 4-round perfect zero-knowledge protocol using the technique due to
Cramer et al. [CDM00] or 3-move concurrent zero-knowledge protocol in the auxiliary
string model based on trapdoor commitment schemes [Dam00]. Note that the prover
does not need to explicitly prove that the r in PK1A and PK1B are the same; they are
bounded to be the same under the discrete logarithm assumption.

4.2

Proof of knowledge of a committed element in an accumulator
value

Suppose y is in the accumulator value v. That is, there exists witness w such that
Ω(w, y, v) = 1. The following protocol demonstrates that the element y, committed as
C, is in the accumulator value v.



y r
y α
PK2 w, y, r : ê(w, g0 g0 ) = ê(v, g0 ) ∧ C = g0 g1
PK2 can be instantiated using the standard proof-of-knowledge of an SDHtuple [BBS04, ASM06].
Combining PK1 and PK2 , we have a protocol, denoted as PK3 , that proves the
knowledge of the discrete logarithm of an element in an accumulator value:



y α
x
PK3 w, y, x : ê(w, g0 g0 ) = ê(v, g0 ) ∧ y = h0

4.3

Proof of knowledge of a committed element not in an accumulator
value

Suppose y is not in the accumulator value v. Then there exists witness w = (c, d) such
that d 6= 0 and Ω(w, y, v) = 1. The following protocol demonstrates that the element
y, committed as C, is not in the accumulator value v.



y α
y r
d
PK4 c, d, y, r : ê(c, g0 g0 ) = ê(v, g0 )ê(g0 , g0 ) ∧ d 6= 0 ∧ C = g0 g1
PK4 can be instantiated using standard techniques. For completeness, its instantiation is shown in Appendix B.
Combining PK1 and PK4 , we have a protocol, denoted as PK5 , that proves the
knowledge of the discrete logarithm of an element not in an accumulator value:



y α
d
x
PK5 c, d, y, x : ê(c, g0 g0 )ê(g0 , g0 ) = ê(v, g0 ) ∧ d 6= 0 ∧ y = h0
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5

Our Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential System

We first formally define the syntax and security model for ABACS. Next, we present
our construction, followed by security proof.

5.1

Syntax

An ABACS is a tuple of six algorithms/protocols (Attribute-CAGen, UserGen, Nym,
CertifyAttribute, RevokeAttribute, Authentication), between three parties, namely, an
ACA O, a User U and any Verifier V.
Attribute-CAGen This is the key generation algorithm of an Attribute CA Oj , who is
responsible for certifying attribute Aj .
UserGen This is the key generation algorithm of a user Ui .
Nym This is an interactive protocol between Ui and Oj to generate a pseudonym yi,j .
A pseudonym is a piece of bit-string that Oj recognizes Ui .
CertifyAttribute This protocol allows Oj to certify attribute Aj for Ui , whom he recognized by pseudonym yi,j . We say Ui is a members of Oj or Ui possesses attribute
Aj upon successful completion of the protocol.
RevokeAttribute This algorithm allows Oj to take away the attribute Aj issued to Ui
whom he recognized by pseudonym yi,j .
Authentication This interactive protocol allows Ui to demonstrate to any verifier V
that he is in possession of a set of attributes satisfying certain policy. A policy
`
W
ST (in DNF) is of the following form: ST =
ST k k=1 such that ST k is the
conjunction of any number of the following statements.
1. Ui possesses attribute Aj
2. Ui is the owner of a pseudonym y with Oj ∗ .
3. (Negation of 1.) Ui does not possess attribute Aj
4. (Negation of 2.) Ui is not the owner of a pseudonym with Oj ∗ .

5.2

Security model

We define a security model to capture the security requirements using a simulationbased approach, in the sense of [CL01]. Firstly we define an ABACS that relies on a
trusted party T as an intermediator. We assume communication between T and any
other parties is secure. This is sometimes referred to as an ideal-world specification of
an ABACS. Next we define what it means for a cryptographic authentication system to
conform to an ideal-world specification.
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5.2.1

An informal description

We present an informal description of the requirements of an ABACS first.
User authenticity The verifier can specify any access policies, and a user can successfully
authenticate if and only if the set of attributes he possesses satisfy the policy. In
particular, user authenticity must be collusion-resistant: no collusion of users who do
not individually satisfy a policy can successfully authenticate w.r.t. that policy.
User anonymity Authentication of users with respect to a policy is anonymous and
unlinkable among the set of all users who satisfy the policy. This is in fact the minimum
amount of information the user must leak to the server for a secure access control.
Attribute-CA autonomy ACAs operate autonomously: an ACA can certify (and possibly later revoke) an attribute without needing to interact with other ACAs.
Attribute Dynamism New ACAs can be introduced without affecting existing users.
Each ACA can certify (and revoke) users’ attribute independently. Existing users do
not need to contact the ACA to reflect the changes.
Attribute privacy Collusion of ACAs together cannot find out what attributes a user
possesses.
Support for attribute negation Users can authenticate their non-possession of an attribute without having to contact (and hence be certified by) the respective ACA in
advance.
5.2.2

Formal model

The formal model is given below.
Ideal-world ABACS system We describe the ideal-world ABACS system (IAS) that
relies on a trusted party T as an intermediator. An IAS consists of a trusted party
T through which all transactions are carried out and a set of honest ideal players. In
IAS, the ideal players are user U, verifier V and ACA O.
Initialization: The system is initialized when every ACA Oj creates a list Lj . Lj
represents the member list of Oj , which is empty at this stage. We say user is in
possession of attribute Aj if and only if he is in Lj .
Ideal communication: All communications are routed through T . The sender can request T not to reveal his identity to the recipient if he wishes to be anonymous. The
sender may also request to establish a session between him and the recipient. In particular, we assume some kind of authentication is implemented between T and each
player. For instance, user Ui cannot contact T , claiming himself to be another user Uj .
Events in the system: Each transaction between players is an event in the system.
Events can be triggered through external processes or controlled by an adversary. An
external process can trigger some particular event between a particular user and an
ACA; or may trigger a set of events; or may cause some probability distribution on the
events.
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Output of the players: In the end of the system’s lifetime, each user outputs a list of
the transactions he participated in and the transaction outcomes.
Transactions: The system supports the following transactions.
• Nym(Ui , Oj ): This protocol is a session between user Ui and ACA Oj . Ui first
contacts T , requesting to establish a pseudonym between himself and Oj . If Ui
and Oj have already established a pseudonym, T simply replies with the previous
one. Otherwise, T picks a pseudonym yi,j for them and informs both Ui and Oj
the value yi,j . T stores yi,j as the pseudonym of user Ui with Oj .
• CertifyAttribute(Ui , Oj ): This protocol is a session between Ui and Oj . Ui first
contacts T with yi,j . If yi,j is not the pseudonym of user Ui with Oj , T replies
“Fail”. Otherwise T contacts Oj with a certification request for pseudonym yi,j .
If Oj accepts the request, T notifies Ui that his request is granted.
• RevokeAttribute(Oj , Ui ): This algorithm allows Oj to revoke the attribute of Ui .
Oj removes yi,j from Lj and notify T the updated Lj . This ideal functionality
is defined to give the adversary the extra power of influencing an honest Oj to
revoke attributes of some of its users.
• Authentication(Ui , V, ST ): This protocol is a session between Ui and V regarding a policy ST which is the conjunction and disjunction of any number of the
following, in disjunctive normal form:
1. Ui possesses attribute Aj (and its negation).
2. Ui is the owner of pseudonym y with Oj (and its negation).
For each Oj that appears in ST (concerning attribute Aj ), T contacts Oj and
obtains Lj . T forwards the set of lists {Lj } to Ui . Upon receiving the list, Ui
decides if he wishes to continue the protocol and if that is the case, T checks
from the set of {Lj } and his list of pseudonym {yi,j } and decides if Ui fulfills
the policy ST . T contacts V with ST , along with the set of lists {Lj }, together
with a bit indicating whether the underlying user fulfills ST or not. V sends his
response to T . T forwards the response to Ui .
Intuitively, this ideal-world system captures the security requirements of an ABACS.
Cryptographic ABACS A cryptographic ABACS system (CAS) consists of a set of
honest cryptographic players. In CAS, these players are user U, verifier V and ACA
O.
The ideal-world (resp. real-world) adversary The ideal-world (resp. real-world)
adversary is a PPT that gets control over the corrupted parties in the ideal world
(resp. real-world). He receives the number of honest users and organizations and
public information of the system as input. The adversary can also trigger an event as
described above.
17

Definition of secure CAS A CAS is secure if it conforms to an ideal-world specification. Informally speaking, CAS is said to be conformed to an ideal-world specification
if there exists a simulator S such that for any real-world adversary A, S, with black-box
access to A, acts as an ideal-world adversary so that the output of all honest players
in IAS is computationally indistinguishable to the output of all honest players in CAS.
S represents adversary-controlled parties in IAS (ideal-world), and honest parties in
CAS (real-world). S translates a real-world adversary into an ideal-world adversary.
Existence of such simulator implies that for any PPT algorithm (real-world adversary)
in CAS, there exists a PPT algorithm (ideal-world adversary) in the ideal-world such
that the outputs of the corresponding honest parties in the two worlds are the same.
Since IAS is secure (any PPT in IAS cannot do anything that breach the security
requirements), CAS is secure. Specifically, we have the following definition.
Definition 5 Let IAS be the ideal-world ABACS. Let CAS be a cryptographic ABACS.
For a security parameter λ, let the number of players in the system be polynomial in
λ. By IAS(1λ , E) (resp., CAS(1λ , E)) we denote an ABACS with security parameter
λ and event scheduler E for the events that have taken place in the system. Let A
be the real-world adversary. Since E schedules the event according to A’s wishes, we
denote it as E A . By Zi (1λ ) we denote the output of (honest) party i in the system. If
{Z1 (1λ ), . . . , Z` (1λ )} is a list of players’ outputs, then we denote these players’ output
λ
by {Z1 (1λ ), . . . , Z` (1λ )}AS(1 ,E) when all of them together exist within an ABACS. CAS
is secure if there exists a simulator S such that the following holds, for all PPT A and
for all sufficiently large λ:
1. In IAS, S controls the ideal-world players corresponding to the real-world players
controlled by A.
2. For all event schedulers E A

{Zi (1λ )}`i=1 , A(1λ )

CAS(1λ ,E) ?


≈ {Zi (1λ )}`i=1 , S A (1λ )

IAS(1λ ,E)

?

where S is given black-box access to A and D1 (1λ ) ≈ D2 (1λ ) denotes computational
indistinguishability of the two distributions D1 and D2 .

5.3

Construction

Description of our construction of ABACS from our DUA is given below, followed by
some discussion on complexity issues.
Common Parameter. We assume ê : G1 × G1 → G2 such that |G1 | = |G2 | = p and
Gq ⊂ Z∗p with |Gq | = q are system-wide parameter.
Attribute-CAGen. Each Oj maintains its own DUA (gj ◦fj working in the bilinear group
pair G1 , G2 ) and a random element hj ∈ Gq . To ensure hj is chosen randomly,
we sets hj = H(Aj ) ∈ Gq , where Aj represents the attribute certified by ACA Oj ,
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for some cryptographic hash function H. Define hj : x 7→ hxj . Oj also maintains
two public lists, Lj and Lj which are initialized to empty list.
UserGen. User Ui chooses his secret key xi ∈R Zq .
Nym. User Ui sends yi,j = hj (xi ) to Oj as his pseudonym. Upon successful completion
of the protocol, we say Ui is the owner of the pseudonym yi,j .
CertifyAttribute. ACA Oj certifies attribute Aj to Ui by setting Lj := Lj ∪ {yi,j }. For
efficiency reason, Oj returns to Ui the membership witness wi,j such that yi,j is
in the accumulator vj = gj ◦ fj (1, Lj )6 Oj also appends the entry (vj , yi,j , ADD)
to list Lj .
RevokeAttribute. ACA Oj sets Lj := Lj \ {yi,j }. Oj computes vj = gj ◦ fj (1, Lj ))
and appends the entry (vj , yi,j , REMOVE) to list Lj . Users use the dynamism
algorithms D2 (resp. D3 ) of our DUA to update its membership witness (resp.
nonmembership witness) with the list Lj .
Authentication. Consider a policy ST (in DNF) of the following form: ST =
`
W
ST k k=1 such that ST k is the conjunction of any number of the following
statements.
1. Ui possesses attribute Aj
2. Ui is the owner of a pseudonym y with Oj ∗ .
3. (Negation of 1). Ui does not possess attribute Aj
4. (Negation of 2). Ui is not the owner of a pseudonym with Oj ∗ .
Each statement above has a corresponding zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge
statement.
1. hj (xi ) is in Lj . This can be done using PK2 described in Section 4.

2. y = hj ∗ (xi ). This can be done using PK4 (xi ) : y = H(Aj ∗ )xi which is
just the standard zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of discrete logarithm.
3. (Negation of 1). hj (xi ) is not in Lj . This can be done using PK3 described
in Section 4.

4. (Negation of 2). y 6= hj ∗ (xi ). This can be done using PK5 (xi ) : y 6=
H(Aj ∗ )xi which is the zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of inequality of
discrete logarithm [CS03].
Thus, to assert ST , one just need to conduct a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge
by the disjunction of conjunction of PK2 , PK3 , PK4 , PK5 , together with the
proof that all xi used in those proofs are equal, which can be done by the employing technique from [CDS94].
6
This is not necessary since the user can compute the witness by himself from Lj but Oj can
compute the value more efficiently with the auxiliary information.
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Complexity issues The most expensive operation is the use of ZKPoK of double
discrete logarithm (that is, PK1 ), which has time and space complexities of O(λk ),
where λk is the security parameter regarding the cheating probability of the protocol7 . Instantiations of other protocols are of constant time and space complexi`
W
ties. For a policy ST =
ST k k=1 , the total complexities is O(``k ) where O(`k )
is the complexities of ST k and is linearly dependent to the number of attributes involved in ST k times λk . Indeed, we can optimize that protocol so that at most one
ZKPoK of double discrete logarithm (that is, PK1 ) is needed in each of the ST k .
Furthermore, due to the nature of [CDS94], our system supports threshold version of
policy efficiently. That is, for a threshold
value k̃ ≤
 `, our system supports policy

`
W
V
with the same complexities as
of the form ST = |K|=k̃,K⊂[1,...,`]
k∈K ST k k=1
`
W
ST =
ST k k=1 .
Security If k is the maximum number of members for any ACA, we have the following
theorem regarding the security of our ABACS.
Theorem 3 (Security of our ABACS construction) Under the k-SDH assumption in G1 , the DDH assumption in Gq , our ABACS is secure in the random oracle
model.
t
u
Its proof can be found in Appendix A.

6

Concluding Remarks

We have presented the first dynamic universal accumulator construction for accumulating elements in DDH-hard groups and a number of useful zero-knowledge protocols
for it. Using this accumulator, we have built the Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential System, which allows the verifier to authenticate anonymous users according to
any access control policy expressible as formula of boolean user attributes in the DNF
form. Our system features many practicality and scalability properties for a large-scale
deployment of privacy-preserving access control in a heterogeneous and decentralized
environment.
We end the paper with two research questions that we believe to be worth exploring
in the future. The first one is how one can construct ABACS that also efficiently supports numeric attributes. (While one could certainly encode a numerical attribute by
a bunch of boolean attributes, that wouldn’t be very efficient.) The second question is
how one can construct ABACS that avoids the need to prove double discrete logarithms,
and hence achieves better efficiency.

7

Since the cheating probability is 2−λk , we suggest λk to be at least 80.
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A
A.1

Security Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1

Proof 1 Let A be an adversary that breaks the security definition in Definition 4 of
an DUA, we show how to construct a simulator S which breaks the security definition
of the underlying UA.
Now we assume A breaks the security property by outputting a membership witness
(resp. nonmembership witness) for an element that is not inside (resp. inside) the
accumulator. On input (f, g), S gives the value g ◦ f to A. S simulates the oracle OD
by computing the accumulation of the updated set. For instance, when A sends add y
query, S inserts y to the set Y , and computes v = g ◦ f(u, Y ) from scratch. Similarly,
when A sends delete y query, S removes y from set Y and computes v = g ◦ f(u, Y ).
Note that both operations do not require the auxiliary information. Finally, A outputs
an element y ∈
/ Y (resp. y ∈ Y ) and a membership witness w (resp. nonmembership
witness w) for y. S outputs w, y, Y and break the security property of the underlying
UA.
t
u

A.2

Proof of Theorem 2

Proof 2 Let A be a polynomial-time adversary to our UA such that the maximum
number of elements to be accumulated is k, we show how to construct a PPT simulator
S which solves the k-SDH problem in G1 by invoking A.
We assume the problem instance is from a restricted class of the q-SDH problem
(specifically, the k-SDH problem instance is in a group of safe-prime order equipped
with a bilinear map). Let ê : G1 × G1 → G2 such that G1 = hg0 i and |g0 | = p such
k
that p = 2q + 1 and both p, q are primes. S is given G1 , G2 , ê, g0 , g0α , . . . , g0α and
∗
its goal ∗is to output w∗ , y ∗ such that w∗ α+y = g0 . Such pair satisfy the relation
ê(w∗ , g0y g0α ) = ê(g0 , g0 ).
Let k be the maximum number of elements to be accumulated in the accumulator.
k
G1 , G2 , ê, g0 , g0α , . . ., g0α , is given to the adversary as the definition of g ◦ f. That is,
f : (u, y) 7→ u(α + y) and g : y 7→ g0y such that g ◦ f(1, Y ) is efficiently computable for
any set Y ⊂ Gq with |Y | ≤ k.
If P1 is non-negligible, A outputs a set Y ⊂ Zp , a value y 0 ∈
/ Y , and a witness w
0
0
such that Ω(w, y , g◦f(1, Y )) = 1 with non-negligible probability. We have ê(w0 , g0y g0α ) =
ê(g ◦ f(1, Y ), g0 ). It is safe to assume α ∈
/ Y , otherwise S solves the k-SDH problem
Q
v(α)
immediately. Let v(α) = y∈Y (α + y). Note that g ◦ f(1, Y ) = g0 . Since y 0 ∈
/ Y,
0
there exists a polynomial q(α) of degree less than k such that v(α) = q(α)(y + α) + d
−q(α) 1
for a constant d. Let w∗ = [w0 g0
] d . w∗ is computable because S can always express
Pi=k−1
i
∗
0
q(α) as i=1 ui α . S sets y = y and returns (w∗ , y ∗ ) as the solution to the k-SDH
problem.
If P2 is non-negligible, A outputs a set Y ⊂ Zp , a value y 0 ∈ Y , and a witness
w = (c0 , d0 ) ∈ G1 ×Z∗p such that Ω(w, y 0 , g ◦f(1, Y )) = 1 with non-negligible probability.
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0

0

/ Y,
That is, ê(c0 , g0y g0α )ê(g0 , g0 )d = ê(g◦f(1, Y ), g0 ). Similarly, it is safe
Q to assume α ∈
otherwise S solves the k-SDH problem immediately. Let v(α) = y∈Y (α + y). Since
y 0 ∈ Y , there exists a polynomial q(α) such that v(α) = q(α)(y 0 + α). S compute
−q(α) −1
w∗ = [c0 g0
] d , sets y ∗ = y 0 and returns (w∗ , y ∗ ) as the solution to the k-SDH
problem.
t
u

A.3

Proof of Theorem 3

Proof 3 In order to prove the security of our ABACS, we must present a simulator S
satisfying Definition 5. We describe such a simulator and give a sketch of a proof that
this simulator satisfies the definition.
The simulator S represents the adversary-controlled parties to the system in the
ideal world and represents the honest parties to the adversary in the real world. In the
random oracle model, S also get control over hash functions. Specifically, S is described
below.
System Parameter and Hash Query We assume ê : G1 × G1 → G2 such that
|G1 | = |G2 | = p and Gq ⊂ Z∗p with |Gq | = q are system-wide parameter. Let h be
a generator of Gq and H : {0, 1}∗ → Gq be a hash function. Recalled that for each
ACA Oj , hj is defined as x 7→ hxj such that hj = H(Aj ) for some cryptographic hash
function H, where Aj is the attribute managed by Oj . For each hash query, say H(Aj ),
S randomly picks ρj ∈R Zq and returns hj = H(Aj ) = hρj . For each honest ACA in the
ideal world, S setup the public keys (DUA) for each of them in the real world honestly.
Representing adversary-controlled users in the ideal world and honest players to adversary-controlled user in the real world
(Nym) When an adversary-controlled user initiates Nym by presenting pseudonym
yi,j to ACA Oj , S searches through the history to locate user i. Specifically, S
maintains a list of LA of adversary-controlled user. The list is indexed by value yi
defined as (yi,j )1/ρj . If i is not found, S adds yi = (yi,j )1/ρj to LA and contacts
T requesting a pseudonym with Oj on behalf of a new user Ui . Otherwise, S
contacts T as an existing user Ui . In both cases, T chooses a pseudonym ỹi,j as
the pseudonym. After that, S appends yi,j , ỹi,j to the row indexed by yi as the
pseudonym between user Ui and yi,j in the real world, and ỹi,j is the corresponding
pseudonym in the ideal world.
(CertifyAttribute) When an adversary-controlled user initiates CertifyAttribute by presenting pseudonym yi,j to organization Oj , S searches through the history to locate
user i. If yi,j is not found, returns “fail”. Otherwise, S contacts T on behalf of
Ui to Oj . If Oj in the ideal world reply with “accept”, S returns “accept” to the
adversary in the real world. S updated the list Lj in the real world as well.
(Authentication) When an adversary-controlled user is involved with Authentication
with an honest verifier, S first examines the policy ST to see if it involve any
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possession of pseudonym. If yes, it locate user Ui using the list LA and contact
T for the corresponding Authentication functionality on behalf of Ui . If it does
not involve any pseudonym, S pick one Ui from the list LA that satisfy the policy
if the authentication in the real world is successful. The simulation fails if the
authentication in the real world is successful yet it fails in the ideal world or S
cannot found out any user in LA satisfy the policy.
Representing adversary-controlled ACAs in the ideal world and honest players to ACAs in the real world
(Nym) When T contacts the adversary-controlled ACA Oj in the ideal world with a
pseudonym ỹi,j , S computes yi,j = hxj for some random x. Note that in our
model, T will not contact Oj if a pseudonym has previously setup between the
underlying user and Oj . S stores ỹi,j and yi,j as a pair in another list LH .
(CertifyAttribute) Using the list LH , S locates the corresponding user and represent it
in the real world. If the adversary-controlled ACA Oj returns “accept”, S notifies
T with “accept”.
Representing adversary-controlled Verifiers in the ideal world and honest
players to Verifiers in the real world
(Authentication) When T contacts S in the ideal world with a policy ST , S acts
accordingly. In particular, if T states that the underlying user satisfies the policy, S uses the zero-knowledge simulator to simulate the Authentication protocol.
This requires controlling the random oracle. S then forwards the response of the
adversary-controlled verifier in the real world back to T . On the other hand, if T
states that the underlying user does not satisfy the policy, S sends some incomplete authentication request to the adversary-controlled verifier and forwards its
response back to T .
Successful Simulation Due to the zero-knowledge nature of our protocols, the simulated Authentication protocols are perfect. Note that, however, the pseudonym formed by
S for honest users in the real world is not correct due to the fact that S simply chooses
x randomly each time. In particular, same underlying user might use different x to
different ACAs. However, under the DDH assumption, adversary will not notice such
difference. The simulation also fails if the authentication (of an adversary-controlled
user) in the real world (to an honest verifier) is successful yet it fails in the ideal world.
This only happens when the adversary is able to fake a proof during the Authentication
protocol and happens with negligible probability provided that our DUA is secure. Thus,
the simulator S satisfies Definition 5 under the DDH assumption and the k-SDH assumption.
t
u
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B

Instantiation of PK4

In addition to g0 and g1 , let g2 , g3 , g4 be independent generators of G1 . The prover
3
computes auxiliary commitments A1 = gβ0 1 gβ1 2 ∈ G1 , A2 = cgβ1 1 , A3 = gβ2 3 gβ3 4 , A4 = gdβ
4
∗
for some randomly generated β1 , β2 , β3 , β4 ∈R Zp . The prover sends A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 to
the verifier and conducts the following proof.

PK4I (d, y, r, β1 , β2 , β3 , β4 , δ1 , δ2 , δ3 , δ4 ) :
β3 β4
δ1 δ2
A1 = gβ0 1 gβ1 2 ∧ 1 = A−y
1 g0 g1 ∧ A3 = g2 g3 ∧
y r
δ3
−d δ3 δ4
1 = A3 g2 g3 ∧ A4 = g4 ∧ C = g0 g1 ∧
ê(A2 ,g1 )
ê(v,g0 )

=

ê(g0 , g0 )d ê(g1 , g1 )β1 ê(g1 , g0 )δ1 ê(A2 , g0 )−y

The verifier also needs to check that A4 6=1, which implies that d 6= 0.
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